Looking for Peace in Iraq
By Adil Shamoo | September 14, 2005
Editor: Erik Leaver
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Foreign Policy In Focus
www.fpif.org
Despite increased U.S. military operations and the stepped-up training of Iraqis, the Iraq insurgency continues to be deadly—nearly 3 U.S. soldiers died per day in August. Dwarfing that number are Iraqi deaths as a result of the fighting which average 34 every day.
What’s most troubling about the attacks is their nature: they largely target innocent civilians. Recently the Iraq Ministry of Interior estimated that insurgent violence has claimed the lives of 12,000 Iraqi civilians since the war began.
Nearly all Iraqis universally condemn these killings. There are even incidents now where some elements of the insurgency are attacking insurgents who target Iraqis.
The United States has been unable to quell the insurgency—in fact, the military can’t even secure a six-mile highway from the Baghdad airport to the city. Killing and jailing insurgents hasn’t worked. Former Department of Defense General Jack Keane estimated two months ago that more than 50,000 insurgents have been killed so far, but their active ranks remain between 16,000 and 20,000. The United States has shown all insurgents in the Muslim world that military power and occupation can’t conquer their hearts and minds.
Recent declarations by U.S. and Iraqi officials that significant troop reductions may begin in early 2006 are welcome because they finally reflect reality—the insurgency in its different forms can’t be defeated on the military battleground. The reason is simple.
In every successful insurgency movement, you have to have a core group surrounded by multiple circles of support—much as an onion has layers upon layers over its center. At the core of the insurgency are the fighters. They are surrounded by layers of support that enable their function: people who provide or store weapons; others who provide financing and other needed supplies; and even those who allow the insurgents to hide.
Outer layers of this support are still powerful. Some people provide information to the insurgency and many others provide the psychological support to the insurgents. And there are others who provide support through their acquiescence, silence, and indifference.
All of these elements create the breeding grounds for a continued insurgency. And the primary cause for these layers of support is opposition to the U.S. occupation. Unfortunately, most policymakers, pundits, and politicians (Republicans or Democrats) don’t talk about the elephant in the room: the occupation. They would rather discuss victory strategies than face the reality that Iraqis are fighting the “liberators” and occupiers.
Recently, I acted as a translator for a day to labor leaders from Iraq who were touring the United States. These courageous Iraqis spanned my native country’s entire political spectrum. But they all were against the insurgents and at the same time wanted to end the occupation as soon a possible and peacefully. Moreover, over 100 members of the Iraqi parliament have signed a petition calling to end the occupation.
There are three things that could restore peace in Iraq: First, the United States (and UN Security Council) must establish guarantees that the U.S. occupation will end. It should be made clear that it is the policy of the United States to leave Iraq as soon as possible. Second, the United States should declare that it has no intention of maintaining any permanent U.S. bases on Iraqi soil and cease building new military facilities.
Finally, the Iraqi government, UN agencies, and the United States should establish a set of benchmarks that can be used as a roadmap for getting out of Iraq and quickly. The United States has been forceful in pushing forth timelines for Iraqis to meet—it is now time for the United States to do the same by setting their own benchmarks and timelines.
Iraqis, the U.S. public, and now even members of the U.S. Congress are calling for an exit strategy. It’s time for President Bush to hear these calls of the people and explain what the plan is and when U.S. troops will come home.
Adil E. Shamoo, born and raised in Baghdad, is a professor at the University of Maryland School of Medicine. He is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org).
Bush's Iraq War:
What are its actual effects?
First the best results:
Saddam Hussein and his abusive despotic government are gone.
This has lifted an enormous burden from the Iraqi people. It has ended a reign of state-executed crime and repression, with offenses ranging up to wholesale murder and torture. This is the strongest argument to support a position that the Iraq War was moral.
This must be balanced against the following other effects, which tend to support a position that the war was immoral. How any particular person balances these opposing arguments depends on personal values; my own answer is that in varying degrees the war was both moral and immoral.
Now the negative results:
* Much of the world sees this as a war of aggression and occupation.
They're right, according to the dictionary definitions of these terms.
* Much of the world sees the war and the campaign of threat leading up to it as terrorism.
Again, the dictionary agrees. The feeling was well-conveyed to me by the impassioned words of a Persion immigrant who said "We all want the end of Saddam Hussein, but why did they have to do it by war?"
* The war caused the deaths of more than 5,000 civilian fatalities and a number of combatants that probably lies somewhere between 10,000 and 100,000. Recently updated death counts are:
5,531 to 7,203 deaths of Iraqi civilians documented by 6/5/03
161 U.S. military deaths reported on 5/28/03
32 British military deaths reported on 5/28/03
* The war's economic cost to the U.S. begins with a down payment of $80 billion, with more to come.
* The war produced anarchy, extensive looting, civil unrest, and disruption of public services in Iraq, including water and power.
Losses include museum artifacts dating from the dawn of civilization. Some of the most critical facilities that were shut down almost completely by looting were hospitals throughout Baghdad. Throughout Iraq availability of electrical power is limited and intermittent, and much of Iraq has no safe water supply. Recently the first cases of cholera were reported, producing high risk of an epidemic due to unsafe water. Most Iraqis complain that they have no government, no help from occupying forces, and limited ability to help themselves due to results of the war.
* Iraq's next government might not be much better.
Early indications are that the majority of Iraqis want an Islamic republic and the Communist Party seems to be leading the race to recruit new members.
* The war has alienated most of the Arab world, including terrorist elements.
There's a good chance that we have created at least a platoon of future Osama bin Ladens and a battalion of militant followers. At a minimum, America is less welcome in much of the Middle East and our international relations in this area have already become much more difficult.
* The war seriously damaged American relationships with traditional allies.
This compounds friction created by numerous earlier examples of Bush administration unilateralism. One result has already been meetings that could initiate a new European alliance for defense will form, excluding the U.S.
There are LOTS MORE!
