Iraq's Nuclear Capabilities
How The Bush Administration Lied to The World, Volume 6
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JoeUser Forums
One way the Bush Administration lied to the world about its motives and justifications in invading Iraq is in lying (as in, making stuff up with no evidence to support it) about Iraq's supposed nuclear capabilities and intentions. They clearly stated that Hussein had the means and intent to start a nuclear war, a prospect so horrible as to sway undecided congressmen and the public in general to support the invasion. In fact, they had no information to make such a claim at the time and were specifically advised that the CIA was "unwilling to speculate" as to the existence of a nuclear program.
From: UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM — MINORITY STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
MARCH 16, 2004 Link
In their potential for destruction and their ability to evoke horror, nuclear weapons
are in a class by themselves.
As Dr. David Kay, former special advisor to the Iraq
Survey Group, testified on January 28, 2004: “all of us have and would continue
to put the nuclear weapons in a different category. It’s a single weapon that can
do tremendous damage, as opposed to multiple weapons that can do the same
order of damage. . . . I think we should politically treat nuclear as a difference.”
For precisely this reason, the Administration’s statements about Iraq’s nuclear
capabilities had a large impact on congressional and public perceptions about the
threat posed by Iraq. Many members of Congress were more influenced by the
Administration’s nuclear assertions than by any other piece of evidence.
Prior to the war, there were significant divisions within the intelligence
community about whether Iraq had resumed efforts to make nuclear weapons. In
his speech on February 5, 2004, Mr. Tenet explained that there was not unanimity
on whether Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and that these differences
were described in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE):
“Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent
effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors"
These doubts and qualifications, however, were not communicated to the public.
Instead, the five Administration officials repeatedly made unequivocal comments
about Iraq’s nuclear program. For example, President Bush said in October 2002
that “[t]he regime has the scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons and is
seeking the materials required to do so.”
Several days later, President Bush
asserted that Saddam Hussein “is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear
weapon.”
Vice President Cheney made perhaps the single most egregious statement about
Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, claiming: “we know he has been absolutely devoted to
trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted
nuclear weapons.”
He made this statement just three days before the war. He
did not admit until September 14, 2003, that his statement was wrong and that he
“did misspeak.
President Bush and others portrayed the threat of Saddam Hussein waging nuclear
war against the United States or its allies as one of the most urgent reasons for
preemptively attacking Iraq. Administration officials used evocative language
and images. On the eve of congressional votes on the Iraq war resolution, for
example, President Bush stated: “Knowing these realities, America must not
ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot
wait for the final proof — the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a
mushroom cloud.”
Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has been unable to find evidence of
the nuclear program described by the five officials. On October 2, 2003, David
Kay reported that “we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook
significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile
material.” In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay reported that “[i]t was not a reconstituted, full-blown nuclear program.” He added, “As best as has
been determined . . . in 2000 they had decided that their nuclear establishment had
deteriorated to such point that it was totally useless.”
His conclusion was that
there was “no doubt at all” that Iraq had less of an ability to produce fissile
material in 2001 than in 1991. According to Dr. Kay, the nuclear program had
been “seriously degraded” and the “activities of the inspectors in the early ‘90s
did a tremendous amount.
"
From: UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM — MINORITY STAFF
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
MARCH 16, 2004 Link
In their potential for destruction and their ability to evoke horror, nuclear weapons
are in a class by themselves.
As Dr. David Kay, former special advisor to the Iraq
Survey Group, testified on January 28, 2004: “all of us have and would continue
to put the nuclear weapons in a different category. It’s a single weapon that can
do tremendous damage, as opposed to multiple weapons that can do the same
order of damage. . . . I think we should politically treat nuclear as a difference.”
For precisely this reason, the Administration’s statements about Iraq’s nuclear
capabilities had a large impact on congressional and public perceptions about the
threat posed by Iraq. Many members of Congress were more influenced by the
Administration’s nuclear assertions than by any other piece of evidence.
Prior to the war, there were significant divisions within the intelligence
community about whether Iraq had resumed efforts to make nuclear weapons. In
his speech on February 5, 2004, Mr. Tenet explained that there was not unanimity
on whether Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and that these differences
were described in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE):
“Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent
effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors"
These doubts and qualifications, however, were not communicated to the public.
Instead, the five Administration officials repeatedly made unequivocal comments
about Iraq’s nuclear program. For example, President Bush said in October 2002
that “[t]he regime has the scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons and is
seeking the materials required to do so.”
Several days later, President Bush
asserted that Saddam Hussein “is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear
weapon.”
Vice President Cheney made perhaps the single most egregious statement about
Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, claiming: “we know he has been absolutely devoted to
trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted
nuclear weapons.”
He made this statement just three days before the war. He
did not admit until September 14, 2003, that his statement was wrong and that he
“did misspeak.
President Bush and others portrayed the threat of Saddam Hussein waging nuclear
war against the United States or its allies as one of the most urgent reasons for
preemptively attacking Iraq. Administration officials used evocative language
and images. On the eve of congressional votes on the Iraq war resolution, for
example, President Bush stated: “Knowing these realities, America must not
ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot
wait for the final proof — the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a
mushroom cloud.”
Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has been unable to find evidence of
the nuclear program described by the five officials. On October 2, 2003, David
Kay reported that “we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook
significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile
material.” In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay reported that “[i]t was not a reconstituted, full-blown nuclear program.” He added, “As best as has
been determined . . . in 2000 they had decided that their nuclear establishment had
deteriorated to such point that it was totally useless.”
His conclusion was that
there was “no doubt at all” that Iraq had less of an ability to produce fissile
material in 2001 than in 1991. According to Dr. Kay, the nuclear program had
been “seriously degraded” and the “activities of the inspectors in the early ‘90s
did a tremendous amount.
"
I'm going to look through your blogs to see you've commented and if you've mentioned writing somewhere else.
