I am calling this a quasi-article as I have decided to give each topic of concern its own respective space as well sa the fact that I simply lack the time to cite each source, develop each tangent, and so on. What I am out to do here is simply present my conclusions so that a friendly debate may be fostered. Let me begin by introducing myself: my name is Nick, am an outspoken moderate, and a politics junkie like any good policy debater (by which I mean the college debate circuit). Perhaps I read too many articles, watch too many news programs, and research too much, but if any of this is the case then I feel it only right that I share my conclusions with those who have not the time for these conclusions as well as those who have devoted similar resources as I while arriving at different conclusions. So much for small talk, let's get down to the "article".
Part 1: Introduction: A Focus on Defense
In the wake of September 11, 2001 the administration of George W. Bush instated what has come to be known as the "Bush Doctrine". This paradigm of foreign policy was a logical product of the anger over the 9/11 attacks as well as the then-newly declared "War on Terror". Logical, of course, because those who were at the helm of such a doctrine were outspoken hawks. Colin Powell began 2001 in near obscurity in the administration, and, as the only alleged dove in the cabinet, became singled out in a post-9/11 world as the spokesman of the wrong response to the attacks. While Powell eventually folded, having since become a loyal advocate of his employer regardless of personal agreements/disagreements, Rumsfeld shone from day one of Bush's administration. Part of this, perhaps, was due to the 1998 "Rumsfeld Report" which claimed that a National Missile Defense (though a feasible one, unlike Reagan's "Star Wars") was necessary to stem the imminent threat of ballistic missile attack. Understandably, with Rumsfeld in place as the Secretary of Defense, NMD research and development was dramatically accelerated in the first nine months of the Bush Jr. administration. Much progress was made, and there is every reason to believe that at this time (had 9/11 not occurred) we may well have been realizing what had been predicted as "theater defense" systems that could be deployed in a naval form to any potentially threatening region of the world. This, of course, would be in order to provide coverage to allies as well as ourselves in order to ensure reinvigorated foreign relations. If Rumsfeld was not enough, the National Security Advisor to the administration, Condoleezza Rice, was previously a highly educated provost of Stanford University. Though her specialty was political science, her main focus was on Soviet ballistic missile offenses as well as future potentialities for American defense policies. National Missile Defense would have been a baffling thing not to see with two such cabinet members, but let us not forget the Vice President, Dick Cheney. Cheney has had a vast and rather impressive political history, but most relevant to the focus of the W. Bush administration on NMD is his time as Secretary of Defense under the Bush Sr. administration. Cheney saw the fall of the Soviet bloc as well as Desert Storm. Following the reports of Senators Nunn and Lugar that stated the former Soviet missile stockpiles were utterly vulnerable to terrorist acquisition due to a devastating lack of capacity in the former Soviet states to fund maintenance, as well as following the Rumsfeld report, the W. Bush administration began on a foot directly concerned with ballistic missile threats as well as the means to prevent them. But then came 9/11.
Part 2: A Transition to Pre-Emption
The Bush Doctrine was a logical step from 9/11, given the personnel within the cabinet as well as the policies they attempted to enact prior to the attacks. From the perspective of hawks among hawks (again, with Powell excluded), the American military had already underwent decades of attempting defensive postures to foreign threats. After the clear failure of these policies to prevent attacks on America, what was left to decide upon was the best way to attack those who would attack us. At the time, no one faulted such processes. The resulting “Bush Doctrine” thus outlined the new defensive posture of the United States, namely, that the strongest military in human history would strike anyone anywhere should they pose a threat to American national security, or if they might ally themselves with those who would seek harm to America in general. Again, at the time, no one faulted such processes. The first result of this doctrine was Afghanistan.
Part 3: The Logical Fallacy of Afghanistan
I was one of the few people I know who did not support the international coalition to topple the Taliban, and reinstate a government run by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. The Bush Doctrine, though being a logical necessity given the backgrounds of the positions of uppermost power in our administration, has some fundamental logical flaws. Firstly, and what caused my opposition to the war in Afghanistan, is the international combining of Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda with Mullah Omar and the Taliban. Why was the nation of Afghanistan to blame for an international terrorist organization? Because that organization’s leader happened to live within the borders of the nation of Afghanistan at the time of September 11th 2001 as well as the planning leading up to the attacks. By the Doctrine, the Taliban was harboring terrorists. In the 1990’s there were people living within the borders of the United States of America by the names of Timothy McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski, and Terry Nichols were not only provided citizenship, but were also given equal treatment as any American citizen, protection under our constitution, and the freedom that we claim during the War on Terror to be the great gift of America to the oppressed people’s of the world. McVeigh and Nichols blew up the Oklahoma City Federal Building, Kaczynski became known as the Unabomber. By the Doctrine, the United States of America was harboring terrorists. If we were to realistically apply the text of the Doctrine in practice as we did in Afghanistan, we should therefore have bombed ourselves. This is, of course, ridiculous, but at the same time this struck me immediately as a reason not to endorse such a doctrine even though it may seem justified on face. Perhaps, then, the Doctrine should not be taken literally. Perhaps, rather, we should simply interpret the Doctrine figuratively as a simple call to pre-emption. Let us consider such a doctrine in terms of practice by other nuclear powers so as to have a realistic idea of the effectiveness of such a doctrine even at the bare theoretical level. The question is simply, then, what other nuclear powers could possibly be relevant to the issue of pre-emption?
Part 4: India and Pakistan
The nations of India and Pakistan both tested subterranean nuclear devices in 1998 (interestingly the same year the Rumsfeld report came out). The reason these devices were subterranean was that neither side had reliable ballistic missile technology; neither side could assure a missile proven to be able to cross borders. Perhaps this is why there was no perceived threat from these nations who teeter on the brink of war over the Kashmir region every handful of years. When Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf came to power by military coup, think-tanks across the nation were certain that his hardliner government would do all they could to initiate a nuclear exchange with India. Now that Musharraf has done everything in his power to aid the American government in the War on Terror, these same think-tanks predict another coup in order to assault America. Why are the prevailing political bodies in Pakistan increasingly hardliner? Because the same goes for the Indian side of the arms race that has been going on since the Kashmir region existed. If the figuratively taken Doctrine were simply upheld to the generalized tone of “pre-emption is a good idea”, it would make sense for either side to attack each other before the other had a chance to attack first. We find ourselves then at the precise fear that perpetuated the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, and it was precisely the opposite of the pre-emption Doctrine that allowed such nuclear exchanges to never take place. Either we do away with the Doctrine in this example and leave ourselves with anti-climactic arms races with the occasional low-impact crisis or incident, or we embrace the Doctrine and initiate a nuclear holocaust. Obviously the Doctrine should not be taken figuratively, and should literally be held as a posture viable only from the perspective of a nuclear power to a non-nuclear one. What does that leave, then, if America is faced with a threat that is nuclear capable?
Part 5: North Korea
Bush Jr. outlined North Korea as a member of the “axis of evil”, citing a direct and impending threat from that nation to our own. No action was done on our part though, until North Korea’s dictator Kim Jong-Il managed to get his country in to the nuclear club. Regardless of whether this was preventable if the United States had kept its side of the deal in the Agreed Framework or if the Sunshine Policy with South Korea had been more helpful, the Bush Doctrine no longer applied to one of the three most dangerous national entities in existence. Why, then, are we not under attack? Quite simply, because the Doctrine itself commits the aforementioned fallacy of combining non-state terrorism with the nations who happen to control the borders those terrorist organizations dwell within. Furthermore, the Doctrine was never intended for states that are able to effectively fight back. This may sound as if it entails droves of inherent moral violations, but let us set those aside for now and adopt a more pragmatic approach: does the Doctrine at least work when we apply it?
Part 6: Iraq
In all fairness, Afghanistan was not pre-emptive. It was by definition a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and so Iraq by definition was our first test of the Doctrine in its intended applicability. As we have now seen, there was no imminent threat in Iraq, and, as Colin Powell has publicly stated, no terrorist link has been made to the former government. Not to mention a lack of weapons of mass destruction, though we have already cited this as a precondition for the Doctrine allowing any sort of military strike to begin with. The first application of the Doctrine’s intended meaning therefore failed, effectively eradicating the credibility of the American government to successfully pre-empt a state militarily. What does this tell us in conclusion about the Doctrine?
Part 7: Conclusion: The Untenable Doctrine
What these microcosm conclusions amount to at a larger level is a simple evaluation of the Bush Doctrine: It is a doctrine which has been specifically rendered by Cold War era hawks to legitimize military invasions of countries that are incapable of defending themselves while at the same time having been accused by the same hawks who made the doctrine that said state retains at least one terrorist within their borders. This doctrine is utterly invalid when applied to any other country, as America has some inexplicable special privilege to pre-empt other nations. Finally, should any [i]actual [/]threat to America become a nuclear one, the doctrine gives way to a middle ground. This middle ground, I think, is the flaw of the entire administration from NMD to the Doctrine. What the Cold War relics in the administration completely forgot was the pragmatic diplomacy of the Clinton era. We are not in a dichotomous world, you are not either with us or with the terrorists, and there is the option to work through national threats by other means as was done with Clinton. Many may say that Clinton was the problem in that he did not capture or kill Bin Laden; however, any claim either way on this is speculative at best as we simply don’t know. What we do know is that the only terrorist actions on U.S. soil with Clinton were American terrorists, and the Gingrich sharply criticized Clinton in the second term as being “obsessed” with terrorism. If Clinton was obsessed, and the only military actions he engaged in were the bombings in Sudan, Iraq (under the no-fly-zone), the “war” in Kosovo, and Somalia, then obviously there is a more pragmatic approach in international relations than what the two Bush administrations managed. Whatever side of the political spectrum you lay on, it seems completely untenable that the Bush Doctrine be seriously considered in any light other than a guise for legitimizing military assaults with as much pre-requisite evidence as was needed during the Salem Witch Trials. The Doctrine is untenable, its application has failed completely, and it is self-contradictory. My conclusion is thus to do away with the Doctrine altogether, move on to a realistic defensive posture, and acknowledge for once the progressive measures of other nations in combating terrorism other than simply invading countries that seem to be potential threats.
Thanks for reading this far, and please, only friendly debate? If needed I will be happy to post extensive follow-ups, if you need sources just let me know.
~Nick
