An Unconventional Strategy
(Vs. the Sitting Duck Strategy)
from 
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The Sitting Duck Strategy
One doesn’t have to be a Dick Cheney on a hunting trip to know that the target is the mallard sitting in the water and not your fellow hunter . For all the “lessons learned” in this “war on terror”, this real-life accident in all of its VP dimension could not have depicted the prevailing force (farce?) that swayed the course of this war more accurately. This strategy of pouring more and more conventional forces in an unconventional war and raising false hopes of victory can rightly be called, “The Sitting Duck Strategy”.
But wait. This blog isn’t just about pointing fingers and past mistakes as it is about analyzing the current strategy and winning this “hearts and minds” battle, meaning, finding America’s place in the world during these freakish times. ..and ,believe me, it doesn’t always have to mean gaining the upper hand as we will understand later.
(Bear with me through some history lessons, ok ?)
A. Perverting Clausewitz (a doctrinal basis for errors)
One of the persistent principles taught in the War Colleges of most developed nations are wrought from the legacy of an 18th century Prussian general, Major –General Carl Phillip Gottlieb von Clausewitz Link. Writing in his classic book, Vom Kriege Link, which is based on his experience from the Napoleonic Wars and Wars of the French Revolution, Clausewitz introduced the very real effects of a superiority in numbers and "mass", which has had a lasting influence in the building of modern armies and conventional warfare, as depicted in the previous world wars. You know, “more” became equated to “better”when it comes to War, in general. The past conventional World Wars concluding to Hiroshima and Nagasaki are even spoken about as a validation of Clausewitzian theory. Yet, what about unconventional warfare, which is the nature on which a dozen or so of Al Qaeda terrorists brought us Sept. 11 ? Geographical boundaries and troop strength are never defined in this kind of war. How would Clausewitz deal with that ?
To quote from the same source:
“The real problem in determining Clausewitz's continuing relevance lies not with his own theoretical approach, which has stood up well over nearly two centuries of intense military and political change. Rather, the problem lies in the way that thinkers with more immediate concerns have adapted Clausewitzian theory to their own narrowly defined eras. We always seem to be comfortable describing the age of warfare just past as "Clausewitzian"--even though Clausewitz never saw a machinegun, a tank, a Viet Cong, or a nuclear weapon. Therefore, the beginning of the 21st century has found many instances of state armies attempting to suppress terrorism, bloody feuds, raids and other intra/supra-state conflict whilst using conventional weaponry.”
According to Christopher Bassford, Ph D., a military historian, the Clausewitz concept of “absolute war“, which meant a war free from any political constraints, which Clausewitz held was impossible was often confused with “total war” – a concept introduced by a WWI German general, Erich Ludendorff, which in this sense involved the total subordination of politics to the war effort—an idea Clausewitz emphatically rejected—and the assumption that total victory or total defeat were the only options. This nihilistic or Armageddonian view of Clausewitz has erroneously and loosely been carried out to validate mass culture catch-phrases such as “nuke’em”.
B. Enter Mao (A Counter-Doctrine for Conventional Warfare)
Although influenced by an earlier book, The Art of War by Sun Tzu, a Confucius contemporary Link, Mao Zedong is credited with elevating his Protracted People’s War as a counter-doctrine to the prevailing Clausewitz concept of achieving military victory through “mass” or a superiority of forces. Based on the experience he had gathered in China’s Civil War where Mao’s lesser forces were able to elude Chiang Kai Sek’s superior Nationalist forces through a Long March, and later build up his peasant army to drive out the Nationalist Army to the island of Formosa (Taiwan), Mao defined the three phases of a Protracted People’s War: (a) Strategic Defensive (b) Strategic Stalemate (c) Strategic Offensive and developed military tactics for guerilla or unconventional warfare, one of which is the popular “one step backward, two steps forward”. Protracted People’s War has then been adopted in defined geographical territories for “Wars of Liberation” as superpowers jockeyed for spheres of influence during the Cold War. A Protracted People’s War was carried out successfully by a Third World country against US forces in the Vietnam War. Among the components in developing the forces for a Protracted People’s War (Ideology, Political, Organizational), Ideology remains of paramount importance. This has been proven by the weakening of “liberation wars” employing a Marxist-Maoist ideology carried out by guerillas in Nepal, Peru and the Philippines upon the dissolution of the old USSR and East bloc states which served as models for Marxist prosperity.
C. The Current Problem: Unconventional Warfare with a Global Face.
In sending out a handful of mostly Saudi men to achieve the notoriety of Sept. 11, Al Qaeda was clearly continuing a protracted people’s war against the US declared by bin Laden several years earlier, but in effect, also carried out this unconventional warfare with no geographically defined boundaries using the globally distributed Muslim population as its mass base. Having previously known the countries tapped by Al Qaeda in carrying out its nefarious activities then,(i.e. Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan), it was clear that the guerilla activities intended against the US were to be carried out using the global terrain as its area of operations. In evaluating our options for an effective response, the US initially picked the right target, which was the reported sanctuary of the Al Qaeda leadership (Afghanistan), yet at that very opportune time of being able to reach out to the Afghans through basic education, health care needs, communications, irrigation and alternate income projects in this “hearts and minds” war, the US declared success there and left to use conventional forces to invade, of all places, Iraq. Clearly, the use of conventional forces in an unconventional war has been misappropriated, which brings us to several lessons learned:
(a) The main conflict to focus on in the “Global War on Terror” is not the fight
between US and Al Qaeda, but the struggle between Muslims and Al Qaeda. US
supports the Muslim struggle against Al Qaeda
(b) Never forget that the enemy draws strength from its mass base nor that the
backbone of the enemy’s fighting strength is their belief system or ideology.
(c) Since a protracted people’s war is designed to foil superiorly numbered
conventional forces, the reliance on conventional troops alone is doomed to fail.
A guerilla force will only engage conventional troops in the phase of strategic offensive or in selected instances of strategic stalemate. Do we really expect the Al Qaeda terrorists to show themselves ala John Wayne when challenged to a draw by US conventional forces ? This perversion of Clausewitz proves that “more” is not “better” but is actually disastrous in fighting unconventional forces.
(d) In undertaking a protracted people’s war, the enemy organizes its attacks in
waves, like the ebb and flow of tides, unlike conventional forces which sustains
its attack until it occupies enemy territory. Therefore, a lull in guerilla attacks should not erroneously be telegraphed as a “success” of a conventional troop offensive ,lest the troops be misled on a reliance of “surges” to defeat Al Qaeda.
If at all, conventional forces should be supportive, and not the main force in fighting an unconventional war.
(e) The main force to fight an unconventional enemy is the unconventional soldier.
This does not necessarily task the SOCOM or Special Forces or any elite
fighting unit in particular, although its supportive training skills may be needed.
Suffice it to say, the attributes that the unconventional soldier should have are
the following:
(1) a thorough knowledge of the history, culture and ideology of the enemy as
well as that of the mass base on which it operates.
(2) a working knowledge of the prevailing language used by the mass base
(3) ability to engage the enemy’s mass base in small group/ family discussions
in order to identify their basic needs and help support/ resolve them.
(4) ability to teach/train from among selected members of the enemy’s mass
base, livelihood skills for their health and sustenance.
(5) with organizational skills to effectively engage community leaders in
resolving their water, electricity, defense and security needs.
(6) ability to demonstrate and teach respect of religions, culture, property and life among the enemy’s mass base, encouraging them to
draw from their own history whatever visions they may have for their own nation-building.
(7) autonomy of sustenance, hygiene and communication, refraining from
depleting the resources of the host household.
Unconventional soldiers will be fielded at a ratio of 4 (four) per household of the enemy’s mass base and will live with the household for a minimum of 3 months before their replacement. Regional security will be provided by a mixture of unconventional and conventional forces operating within and at the periphery of the secured zone. Force distribution will be determined by the structural make-up of the neighborhood being engaged.
Recognition of Previous Errors
Tapping of the tribal sheiks’ initiatives in Anbar province, although not without risks, has been a step in the correct direction. The kidnapping and killing of tribal chiefs later by Al Qaeda confirms that the US has opened a raw nerve in the enemy’s heel in this unconventional war. Instead of relying on open recruitment for Iraq’s police force however, which risks infiltration by Al Qaeda, the engagement by the unconventional soldier at the local level could serve as the vetting process in which the best suitable community-oriented candidate could be selected for police/ home defense training. Remember that Al Qaeda was born when the US unconditionally armed Muslims resisting Soviet occupation in Afghanistan .Building the Iraqi defense forces from the ground up as engagements move from neighborhood to neighborhood is a slower process but it certainly is worth avoiding the obvious risk of spawning a militia with an Al Qaeda agenda within Iraq’s fledgling security force that could easily come about if the only conditions imposed were the acceptance of arms and payroll from the US.
Although after 6 painful years we are finally moving away from the Sitting Duck Strategy despite political pressures, transitioning the fight to an unconventional army has been a slow birthing process, but the lives that have been sacrificed, resources that have been wasted and the resultant strain on the nation’s economy and security, demand a responsible closure.to what could have been America’s preventable hemorrhage. It demands less of the bullets and more of America’s human face in the frontlines. It demands an unconventional soldier.
One doesn’t have to be a Dick Cheney on a hunting trip to know that the target is the mallard sitting in the water and not your fellow hunter . For all the “lessons learned” in this “war on terror”, this real-life accident in all of its VP dimension could not have depicted the prevailing force (farce?) that swayed the course of this war more accurately. This strategy of pouring more and more conventional forces in an unconventional war and raising false hopes of victory can rightly be called, “The Sitting Duck Strategy”.
But wait. This blog isn’t just about pointing fingers and past mistakes as it is about analyzing the current strategy and winning this “hearts and minds” battle, meaning, finding America’s place in the world during these freakish times. ..and ,believe me, it doesn’t always have to mean gaining the upper hand as we will understand later.
(Bear with me through some history lessons, ok ?)
A. Perverting Clausewitz (a doctrinal basis for errors)
One of the persistent principles taught in the War Colleges of most developed nations are wrought from the legacy of an 18th century Prussian general, Major –General Carl Phillip Gottlieb von Clausewitz Link. Writing in his classic book, Vom Kriege Link, which is based on his experience from the Napoleonic Wars and Wars of the French Revolution, Clausewitz introduced the very real effects of a superiority in numbers and "mass", which has had a lasting influence in the building of modern armies and conventional warfare, as depicted in the previous world wars. You know, “more” became equated to “better”when it comes to War, in general. The past conventional World Wars concluding to Hiroshima and Nagasaki are even spoken about as a validation of Clausewitzian theory. Yet, what about unconventional warfare, which is the nature on which a dozen or so of Al Qaeda terrorists brought us Sept. 11 ? Geographical boundaries and troop strength are never defined in this kind of war. How would Clausewitz deal with that ?
To quote from the same source:
“The real problem in determining Clausewitz's continuing relevance lies not with his own theoretical approach, which has stood up well over nearly two centuries of intense military and political change. Rather, the problem lies in the way that thinkers with more immediate concerns have adapted Clausewitzian theory to their own narrowly defined eras. We always seem to be comfortable describing the age of warfare just past as "Clausewitzian"--even though Clausewitz never saw a machinegun, a tank, a Viet Cong, or a nuclear weapon. Therefore, the beginning of the 21st century has found many instances of state armies attempting to suppress terrorism, bloody feuds, raids and other intra/supra-state conflict whilst using conventional weaponry.”
According to Christopher Bassford, Ph D., a military historian, the Clausewitz concept of “absolute war“, which meant a war free from any political constraints, which Clausewitz held was impossible was often confused with “total war” – a concept introduced by a WWI German general, Erich Ludendorff, which in this sense involved the total subordination of politics to the war effort—an idea Clausewitz emphatically rejected—and the assumption that total victory or total defeat were the only options. This nihilistic or Armageddonian view of Clausewitz has erroneously and loosely been carried out to validate mass culture catch-phrases such as “nuke’em”.
B. Enter Mao (A Counter-Doctrine for Conventional Warfare)
Although influenced by an earlier book, The Art of War by Sun Tzu, a Confucius contemporary Link, Mao Zedong is credited with elevating his Protracted People’s War as a counter-doctrine to the prevailing Clausewitz concept of achieving military victory through “mass” or a superiority of forces. Based on the experience he had gathered in China’s Civil War where Mao’s lesser forces were able to elude Chiang Kai Sek’s superior Nationalist forces through a Long March, and later build up his peasant army to drive out the Nationalist Army to the island of Formosa (Taiwan), Mao defined the three phases of a Protracted People’s War: (a) Strategic Defensive (b) Strategic Stalemate (c) Strategic Offensive and developed military tactics for guerilla or unconventional warfare, one of which is the popular “one step backward, two steps forward”. Protracted People’s War has then been adopted in defined geographical territories for “Wars of Liberation” as superpowers jockeyed for spheres of influence during the Cold War. A Protracted People’s War was carried out successfully by a Third World country against US forces in the Vietnam War. Among the components in developing the forces for a Protracted People’s War (Ideology, Political, Organizational), Ideology remains of paramount importance. This has been proven by the weakening of “liberation wars” employing a Marxist-Maoist ideology carried out by guerillas in Nepal, Peru and the Philippines upon the dissolution of the old USSR and East bloc states which served as models for Marxist prosperity.
C. The Current Problem: Unconventional Warfare with a Global Face.
In sending out a handful of mostly Saudi men to achieve the notoriety of Sept. 11, Al Qaeda was clearly continuing a protracted people’s war against the US declared by bin Laden several years earlier, but in effect, also carried out this unconventional warfare with no geographically defined boundaries using the globally distributed Muslim population as its mass base. Having previously known the countries tapped by Al Qaeda in carrying out its nefarious activities then,(i.e. Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan), it was clear that the guerilla activities intended against the US were to be carried out using the global terrain as its area of operations. In evaluating our options for an effective response, the US initially picked the right target, which was the reported sanctuary of the Al Qaeda leadership (Afghanistan), yet at that very opportune time of being able to reach out to the Afghans through basic education, health care needs, communications, irrigation and alternate income projects in this “hearts and minds” war, the US declared success there and left to use conventional forces to invade, of all places, Iraq. Clearly, the use of conventional forces in an unconventional war has been misappropriated, which brings us to several lessons learned:
(a) The main conflict to focus on in the “Global War on Terror” is not the fight
between US and Al Qaeda, but the struggle between Muslims and Al Qaeda. US
supports the Muslim struggle against Al Qaeda
(b) Never forget that the enemy draws strength from its mass base nor that the
backbone of the enemy’s fighting strength is their belief system or ideology.
(c) Since a protracted people’s war is designed to foil superiorly numbered
conventional forces, the reliance on conventional troops alone is doomed to fail.
A guerilla force will only engage conventional troops in the phase of strategic offensive or in selected instances of strategic stalemate. Do we really expect the Al Qaeda terrorists to show themselves ala John Wayne when challenged to a draw by US conventional forces ? This perversion of Clausewitz proves that “more” is not “better” but is actually disastrous in fighting unconventional forces.
(d) In undertaking a protracted people’s war, the enemy organizes its attacks in
waves, like the ebb and flow of tides, unlike conventional forces which sustains
its attack until it occupies enemy territory. Therefore, a lull in guerilla attacks should not erroneously be telegraphed as a “success” of a conventional troop offensive ,lest the troops be misled on a reliance of “surges” to defeat Al Qaeda.
If at all, conventional forces should be supportive, and not the main force in fighting an unconventional war.
(e) The main force to fight an unconventional enemy is the unconventional soldier.
This does not necessarily task the SOCOM or Special Forces or any elite
fighting unit in particular, although its supportive training skills may be needed.
Suffice it to say, the attributes that the unconventional soldier should have are
the following:
(1) a thorough knowledge of the history, culture and ideology of the enemy as
well as that of the mass base on which it operates.
(2) a working knowledge of the prevailing language used by the mass base
(3) ability to engage the enemy’s mass base in small group/ family discussions
in order to identify their basic needs and help support/ resolve them.
(4) ability to teach/train from among selected members of the enemy’s mass
base, livelihood skills for their health and sustenance.
(5) with organizational skills to effectively engage community leaders in
resolving their water, electricity, defense and security needs.
(6) ability to demonstrate and teach respect of religions, culture, property and life among the enemy’s mass base, encouraging them to
draw from their own history whatever visions they may have for their own nation-building.
(7) autonomy of sustenance, hygiene and communication, refraining from
depleting the resources of the host household.
Unconventional soldiers will be fielded at a ratio of 4 (four) per household of the enemy’s mass base and will live with the household for a minimum of 3 months before their replacement. Regional security will be provided by a mixture of unconventional and conventional forces operating within and at the periphery of the secured zone. Force distribution will be determined by the structural make-up of the neighborhood being engaged.
Recognition of Previous Errors
Tapping of the tribal sheiks’ initiatives in Anbar province, although not without risks, has been a step in the correct direction. The kidnapping and killing of tribal chiefs later by Al Qaeda confirms that the US has opened a raw nerve in the enemy’s heel in this unconventional war. Instead of relying on open recruitment for Iraq’s police force however, which risks infiltration by Al Qaeda, the engagement by the unconventional soldier at the local level could serve as the vetting process in which the best suitable community-oriented candidate could be selected for police/ home defense training. Remember that Al Qaeda was born when the US unconditionally armed Muslims resisting Soviet occupation in Afghanistan .Building the Iraqi defense forces from the ground up as engagements move from neighborhood to neighborhood is a slower process but it certainly is worth avoiding the obvious risk of spawning a militia with an Al Qaeda agenda within Iraq’s fledgling security force that could easily come about if the only conditions imposed were the acceptance of arms and payroll from the US.
Although after 6 painful years we are finally moving away from the Sitting Duck Strategy despite political pressures, transitioning the fight to an unconventional army has been a slow birthing process, but the lives that have been sacrificed, resources that have been wasted and the resultant strain on the nation’s economy and security, demand a responsible closure.to what could have been America’s preventable hemorrhage. It demands less of the bullets and more of America’s human face in the frontlines. It demands an unconventional soldier.
