WHY Bush and Cheney MUST BE IMPEACHED!
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In 2002 Bush and Cheney were telling the American People and Congress that we had to remove Saddam from power because to fail to act would risk “Mushroom clouds over American Cities”. Make no mistake about it, it was the belief that Saddam might use nuclear weapons against the U.S. that was feared most and was the issue that convinced Congress to give President Bush the authority to invade Iraq.
At the same time Bush and Cheney were pushing the nuclear threat issue from Saddam, the National Intelligence Estimate had several conclusions that said Saddam had no such weapons and would most likely not be able to acquire such weapons for 5-7 years. This NIE was classified and was only shared with the top leaders of Congress and the members of the intelligence Committees in Congress. The majority of Congress was not given the NIE assessment that Saddam did not have nuclear weapons in 2002 and would not be able to acquire such weapons for 5-7 years.
Time has proven that the 2002 NIE assessment of Saddam’s nuclear capability was correct. The argument by Bush and Cheney that we did not find WMD in Iraq because of the failure of our intelligence is incorrect so far as the nuclear threat is concerned. Bush further contends that Congress agreed that Saddam was a such a great threat that they gave Bush the authority to go to war AS A LAST RESORT. The problem is that when Congress voted on the Iraq War Resolution, the majority DID NOT have the NIE from 2002 because it was classified. Those few members of Congress that did have this intelligence could not share the information with other members of Congress or the American People without violating the law. Thus Congress acted WITHOUT the intelligence from the 16 U.S. Intelligence Agencies that said in 2002 and for 5-7 years in the future Saddam did not pose the nuclear threat the Bush and Cheney claimed when they asked for the authority to invade Iraq and depose Saddam.
Thus, we had a President and Vice President that ignored the most comprehensive intelligence about the major potential threat from Iraq – nuclear weapons. We had a President and Vice President that warned of the smoking gun in the form of Mushroom Clouds over our cities if we failed to remove Saddam from power knowing that Saddam did not have the weapons to conduct a nuclear attack against the United States!.
It was not the failure of our intelligence but the LIES of our two top leaders about the actual danger to our country posed by Saddam in 2002. For this reason, both Bush and Cheney should be Impeached and removed from office. There is no greater offense that a President can commit then taking our country to war predicated on lies. There was no nuclear threat in 2002 from Saddam and Bush and Cheney had the intelligence that said that was the case and deliberately asserted this danger in direct opposition to the intelligence. They further kept that intelligence CLASSIFIED so it was not available to ALL members of Congress and the American People. Bush and Cheney knew, if Congress and the American people saw that Saddam did not have nuclear weapons they would NOT support the invasion of Iraq.
Below are excerpts from the now declassified 2002 NIE that Bush and Cheney had and the majority of Congress and the American people did not have prior to the Iraq War Vote:
How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.
Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.
Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.
State/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program
The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapons-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.
In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
Moderate Confidence:
• Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one but is likely to have a weapon by 2007 to 2009.
Low Confidence
• When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction.
• Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the US Homeland.
• Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.
INR's Alternative View: Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes
Some of the specialized but dual-use items being sought are, by all indications, bound for Iraq's missile program. Other cases are ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnet-production line whose suitability for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some efforts involve non-controlled industrial material and equipment -- including a variety of machine tools -- and are troubling because they would help establish the infrastructure for a renewed nuclear program. But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors departed) are not clearly linked to a nuclear end-use. Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.
