619 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 453, 464-65 (1855).
620 Cf. 2 Stat. 78. The provision has long since dropped out of the statute book.
621 Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887).
622 Cf. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670-671 (1897), where it was held that presumptions in favor of official action “preclude collateral attack on the sentences of courts-martial.” See also United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1893); Bishop v. United States, 197 U.S. 334, 341-342 (1905), both of which in effect repudiate Runkle.
The general rule, as stated by the Court, is that when any duty is cast by law upon the President, it may be exercised by him through the head of the appropriate department, whose acts, if performed within the law, thus become the President’s acts.623 Williams v. United States624 involved an act of Congress which prohibited the advance of public money in any case whatever to disbursing officers of the United States, except under special direction by the President.625 The Supreme Court held that the act did not require the personal performance by the President of this duty. Such a practice, said the Court, if it were possible, would absorb the duties of the various departments of the government in the personal acts of one chief executive officer, and be fraught with mischief to the public service. The President’s duty in general requires his superintendence of the administration; yet he cannot be required to become the administrative officer of every department and bureau, or to perform in person the numerous details incident to services which, nevertheless, he is, in a correct sense, by the Constitution and laws required and expected to perform.626 As a matter of administrative practice, in fact, most orders and instructions emanating from the heads of the departments, even though in pursuance of powers conferred by statute on the President, do not even refer to the President.627
623 The President, in the exercise of his executive power under the Constitution, “speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments in relation to subjects which appertain to their respective duties.” The heads of the departments are his authorized assistants in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts. Wilcox v. McConnel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839). See also United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291 (1842); Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 290, 297 (1843); United States v. Jones, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 92, 95 (1856); The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1874); United States v. Farden, 99 U.S. 10 (1879); Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 755 (1880).
624 42 U.S. (1 How.) 290 (1843).
625 3 Stat. 723 (1823), now covered in 31 U.S.C. § 3324.
626 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 297-98.
627 38 Ops. Atty. Gen. 457, 458 (1936). And, of course, if the President exercises his duty through subordinates, he must appoint them or appoint the officers who appoint them, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 109-143 (1976), and he must have the power to discharge those officers in the Executive Branch, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), although the Court has now greatly qualified Myers to permit congressional limits on the removal of some officers. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
So Gene, even the courts agree you're full of crap.
