Brute Military Force
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Brute military force is an ineffective measure against terrorism. If anything, military force can only serve to kill the perpetrators of terrorism in retaliation or preemption. There is, according to Pillar, “an inherent difficulty [in] using force in a situation in which the terrorists have the advantage of being able—and willing—to use it immediately against their captives” (99). Whether the strike is retaliatory or preemptive in nature, there are certain risks in starting the bullets to fly.
The response to 9/11 is the most recent example of the effectiveness of both retaliatory and preemptive counterterrorist strikes. The invasion of Afghanistan was clear and quite relevant; as the smoke over Manhattan cleared, it was obvious that the perpetrators were being sheltered in Afghanistan. Washington invoked the NATO Charter’s Article V, requiring all NATO countries to respond to an attack on any NATO country, a distinguishing stipulation of any community defense agreement. The retaliatory invasion of Afghanistan was an easy sell to the nations of NATO and the world; America was in clear and present danger from the Taliban dwelling in Kabul, and a multinational response was appropriate considering the mutual threat. According to United Nations (UN) Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Europe and North America have a unique strategic responsibility to uphold global stability. To continue to meet that responsibility, they must be prepared to project stability, in new ways and in new places, and to do so together” (Niskanen 2004). With the help of NATO forces and Taliban resistance movements like the Northern Alliance, the Taliban were overthrown within weeks and driven to the eastern mountains. Osama was chased into places like Tora Bora and eventually the trail turned cold, but the efficacy of the multilateral action against terrorism was not lost on those who perpetrated the terror. The civilized world would not allow rogue regimes to support and fund terrorism.
The justification for invading Iraq was a little more muddied and more of a logical stretch. Hot on the heels of the successful Afghanistan invasion, President Bush was appealing to all who would listen to assemble a so-called coalition of the willing to enforce the many resolutions which Saddam Hussein had ignored since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Appeals to the UN for redress were to no avail, so the US military (along with the coalition of the willing) launched an ostensibly counterterrorist action against the Saddam regime in Baghdad. The resulting preemptive move has resulted in mixed outcomes: Saddam Hussein was executed in 2006 for crimes against the Kurds, yet since his overthrow Iraq has been wracked with bloody sectarian turmoil. Reconciliation or compromise with the various factions within post-war Iraq is all but gone now. While the American Congress calls for retreat and unconditional surrender, soldiers continue to fight for the eventual conciliation of warring parties in Iraq. American overstretch has probably been reached, as the US military fights wars on two fronts and continues to overwork its soldiers.
The resulting backlash against American hard power has been tremendous and has cost the US much in diplomatic circles. Talk of “imperial decline” and the “end of the American era in the Middle East” have been echoed by academics and diplomats alike. “Across the world, anti-Americanism has increased to the point where the United States is often regarded as a threat to world peace rather than its guarantor” (“Still” 2007). The American candle has flickered, and many are worried that a non-polar world is far scarier than a unipolar one.
It will be incredibly unlikely that military action will ever pacify the terrorists in Iraq. Calling in the Marines can never sway the hearts and minds of those who might be recruited to terror. Brute military force will take out the insurgencies of the world while conversely bringing more to rally around the cause.
Sources:
“The Hobbled Hegemon.” Economist, 30 Jun 2007: 29-32.
Niskanen, William A. “Revise the NATO Charter before Accepting a Global Role.” Cato Institute, 29 Jun 2004. Internet: Link, accessed 8 Jul 2007.
“The North Atlantic Treaty.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 April 1949. Internet: Link, accessed 8 Jul 2007.
Pillar, Paul R. Terrorism and US Foreign Policy. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
“Still No. 1.” Economist, 30 Jun 2007: 11-12.
The response to 9/11 is the most recent example of the effectiveness of both retaliatory and preemptive counterterrorist strikes. The invasion of Afghanistan was clear and quite relevant; as the smoke over Manhattan cleared, it was obvious that the perpetrators were being sheltered in Afghanistan. Washington invoked the NATO Charter’s Article V, requiring all NATO countries to respond to an attack on any NATO country, a distinguishing stipulation of any community defense agreement. The retaliatory invasion of Afghanistan was an easy sell to the nations of NATO and the world; America was in clear and present danger from the Taliban dwelling in Kabul, and a multinational response was appropriate considering the mutual threat. According to United Nations (UN) Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Europe and North America have a unique strategic responsibility to uphold global stability. To continue to meet that responsibility, they must be prepared to project stability, in new ways and in new places, and to do so together” (Niskanen 2004). With the help of NATO forces and Taliban resistance movements like the Northern Alliance, the Taliban were overthrown within weeks and driven to the eastern mountains. Osama was chased into places like Tora Bora and eventually the trail turned cold, but the efficacy of the multilateral action against terrorism was not lost on those who perpetrated the terror. The civilized world would not allow rogue regimes to support and fund terrorism.
The justification for invading Iraq was a little more muddied and more of a logical stretch. Hot on the heels of the successful Afghanistan invasion, President Bush was appealing to all who would listen to assemble a so-called coalition of the willing to enforce the many resolutions which Saddam Hussein had ignored since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Appeals to the UN for redress were to no avail, so the US military (along with the coalition of the willing) launched an ostensibly counterterrorist action against the Saddam regime in Baghdad. The resulting preemptive move has resulted in mixed outcomes: Saddam Hussein was executed in 2006 for crimes against the Kurds, yet since his overthrow Iraq has been wracked with bloody sectarian turmoil. Reconciliation or compromise with the various factions within post-war Iraq is all but gone now. While the American Congress calls for retreat and unconditional surrender, soldiers continue to fight for the eventual conciliation of warring parties in Iraq. American overstretch has probably been reached, as the US military fights wars on two fronts and continues to overwork its soldiers.
The resulting backlash against American hard power has been tremendous and has cost the US much in diplomatic circles. Talk of “imperial decline” and the “end of the American era in the Middle East” have been echoed by academics and diplomats alike. “Across the world, anti-Americanism has increased to the point where the United States is often regarded as a threat to world peace rather than its guarantor” (“Still” 2007). The American candle has flickered, and many are worried that a non-polar world is far scarier than a unipolar one.
It will be incredibly unlikely that military action will ever pacify the terrorists in Iraq. Calling in the Marines can never sway the hearts and minds of those who might be recruited to terror. Brute military force will take out the insurgencies of the world while conversely bringing more to rally around the cause.
Sources:
“The Hobbled Hegemon.” Economist, 30 Jun 2007: 29-32.
Niskanen, William A. “Revise the NATO Charter before Accepting a Global Role.” Cato Institute, 29 Jun 2004. Internet: Link, accessed 8 Jul 2007.
“The North Atlantic Treaty.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 April 1949. Internet: Link, accessed 8 Jul 2007.
Pillar, Paul R. Terrorism and US Foreign Policy. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
“Still No. 1.” Economist, 30 Jun 2007: 11-12.
