Is American Hegemony Sustainable?
Can we stay number one?
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Will the United States be forever the sole power in the world stage? Kenenth Waltz said, "The American aspiration to freeze historical development by working to keep the world unipolar is doomed." (p. 345) Let's react to this in the context of the "rise of China."
Kenneth Waltz said that America was trying to maintain "the least
durable of international configurations": a unipolar world (Kaufman
339). Unipolar worlds are by their very nature fragile, since two
forces work against it:
1) the inevitable rise of a balancing force. As of 1999, Waltz says
that appears to be either a unified Europe or Japan. But in 2006, I say
China.
2) the rising cost of maintaining a hegemony. Look at the billions of
dollars we've spent in our "War on Terror" and tell me this is sustainable.
...
An appendage to my first thought:
The American hegemony does not appear to be sustainable. Waltz cites two reasons for this:
First, that "dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own
borders, thus weakening themselves in the long run" (Kaufman 339). We
can see that in the news: according to the Associated Press, "The U.S.
administration is spending about $7 billion a month to wage the war on
terror and costs could total $570 billion by the end of 2010."
Second, Waltz summarized the weaker states' reaction to a powerful
hegemonic actor. "For the short duration of unipolarity... even if a
dominant power behaves with moderation, weaker states will worry about
its future behavior" (Kaufman 339). The United States may be a kind,
benevolent hegemon now, but what happens twenty years from now when most
every other nation has succumbed to the sway of American might? Then a
more powerful administration comes along, flexing its new muscles in
establishing too much American and not enough international power.
Waltz continued by citing the reactions that nations undergo in order to
check unfettered power. "Faced by unbalanced power, some states try to
increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the
international distribution of power into balance" (Ibid.).
The United States wields much power on the world stage at this time.
Where will America stand twenty or fifty years from now? Waltz
predicts that another regional power will rise to global dominance, just
to fill the vacuum of power left by the collapsed Soviet Union. Could
it be China or Japan or a unified Europe?
...
Waltz wrote that "the American aspiration to freeze historical
development by working to keep the world unipolar is doomed." (Kaufman
345) China, however, is going to be the great breaker of American
hegemonic stability. Henry Kissinger wrote recently, "The rise of China
-- and of Asia -- will, over the next decades, bring about a substantial
reordering of the international system. The center of gravity of world
affairs is shifting from the Atlantic, where it was lodged for the past
three centuries, to the Pacific."
Kissinger continued by explaining that China's rise is like unto that of
imperial Germany's 20th century rise to power. It was an inevitable
course to war, one that was hoped by European leaders to be short,
relatively bloodless, and of strategic importance only. Instead, what
the world received was two bloody world wars.
How China relates to Germany is that like the Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler
regimes, the Chinese are pursuing an aggressive foreign policy and
developing advanced armaments. China's foreign policy differs from
Germany's in one respect: military imperialism is not the way China
likes to do business. They follow Sun Tzu, not Clausewitz. China
believes wearing down one's enemy is the sure way to win in battle;
German order of battle required a toe-to-toe shootout. China's
insidious claws are felt around the world, but most importantly in the
United States.
China is already waging economic warfare with the United States. The
Chinese government is the largest single holder of US Treasury bonds.
The Asia Times reports: "China is recycling its US$100 billion-plus
trade surplus with the US back into dollars, and especially into US
Treasury bonds. Almost half of the US Treasury bonds are now owned in
Asia." Recently, China tried to purchase Unocal, an American oil
company (BBC). The best case scenario is that China is trying to
benefit from American economic power. The worst case scenario is that
they are trying to weaken the American economy by linking America with
China. A war between these states would cause the collapse of the
American economic powerhouse.
I would like examine our current China policy in a historical context.
We adopted a Communist containment policy after World War II, when the
Soviet Union was breathing down Western Europe's neck and China
threatened the Korean peninsula. The Soviets found a weak Europe ripe
for the taking; it took half and threatened a land invasion to the other
half. Secretary of State Dean Acheson neglectfully left Korea off a
list of American defensive periphery and soon thereafter the
Chinese-and-Soviet-bolstered North Korean Army swept south. The Korean
War was an attempt to contain the so-called Red Menace, which had its
origins in both Russia and China.
Right now, China is a very strong, but regional, player. But the
Chinese will rise to global power in the east. Whether they will come
at America with swords drawn or hand extended is still up in the air.
It is America's hope that containing China -- keeping it down
economically and strategically -- will be the key to maintaining
American hegemony throughout the 21st century.
Sources:
"China oil firm in Unocal bid war." BBC News, 23 June 2005. Internet: BBC News, accessed 7 April 2006.
"Iraq War costs could hit $570 billion US by 2010, troop levels not sustainable," CBC News, Internet: CBC News, accessed 7 April 2006.
Kissinger, Henry. "China: Containment Won't Work." Washington Post, 13 June 2005. Internet: Washington Post, accessed 7 April 2006.
"Structural Realism After the Cold War." by Kenneth Waltz. From Kaufman, et.al., Understanding International Relations: The Value of Alternative Lenses. Boston, McGraw-Hill. 2004.
Williams, Ian. "China-US: Double bubbles in danger of colliding." Asia Times, 23 January 2004. Internet: Asia Times, accessed 7 April 2006.
Kenneth Waltz said that America was trying to maintain "the least
durable of international configurations": a unipolar world (Kaufman
339). Unipolar worlds are by their very nature fragile, since two
forces work against it:
1) the inevitable rise of a balancing force. As of 1999, Waltz says
that appears to be either a unified Europe or Japan. But in 2006, I say
China.
2) the rising cost of maintaining a hegemony. Look at the billions of
dollars we've spent in our "War on Terror" and tell me this is sustainable.
...
An appendage to my first thought:
The American hegemony does not appear to be sustainable. Waltz cites two reasons for this:
First, that "dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own
borders, thus weakening themselves in the long run" (Kaufman 339). We
can see that in the news: according to the Associated Press, "The U.S.
administration is spending about $7 billion a month to wage the war on
terror and costs could total $570 billion by the end of 2010."
Second, Waltz summarized the weaker states' reaction to a powerful
hegemonic actor. "For the short duration of unipolarity... even if a
dominant power behaves with moderation, weaker states will worry about
its future behavior" (Kaufman 339). The United States may be a kind,
benevolent hegemon now, but what happens twenty years from now when most
every other nation has succumbed to the sway of American might? Then a
more powerful administration comes along, flexing its new muscles in
establishing too much American and not enough international power.
Waltz continued by citing the reactions that nations undergo in order to
check unfettered power. "Faced by unbalanced power, some states try to
increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the
international distribution of power into balance" (Ibid.).
The United States wields much power on the world stage at this time.
Where will America stand twenty or fifty years from now? Waltz
predicts that another regional power will rise to global dominance, just
to fill the vacuum of power left by the collapsed Soviet Union. Could
it be China or Japan or a unified Europe?
...
Waltz wrote that "the American aspiration to freeze historical
development by working to keep the world unipolar is doomed." (Kaufman
345) China, however, is going to be the great breaker of American
hegemonic stability. Henry Kissinger wrote recently, "The rise of China
-- and of Asia -- will, over the next decades, bring about a substantial
reordering of the international system. The center of gravity of world
affairs is shifting from the Atlantic, where it was lodged for the past
three centuries, to the Pacific."
Kissinger continued by explaining that China's rise is like unto that of
imperial Germany's 20th century rise to power. It was an inevitable
course to war, one that was hoped by European leaders to be short,
relatively bloodless, and of strategic importance only. Instead, what
the world received was two bloody world wars.
How China relates to Germany is that like the Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler
regimes, the Chinese are pursuing an aggressive foreign policy and
developing advanced armaments. China's foreign policy differs from
Germany's in one respect: military imperialism is not the way China
likes to do business. They follow Sun Tzu, not Clausewitz. China
believes wearing down one's enemy is the sure way to win in battle;
German order of battle required a toe-to-toe shootout. China's
insidious claws are felt around the world, but most importantly in the
United States.
China is already waging economic warfare with the United States. The
Chinese government is the largest single holder of US Treasury bonds.
The Asia Times reports: "China is recycling its US$100 billion-plus
trade surplus with the US back into dollars, and especially into US
Treasury bonds. Almost half of the US Treasury bonds are now owned in
Asia." Recently, China tried to purchase Unocal, an American oil
company (BBC). The best case scenario is that China is trying to
benefit from American economic power. The worst case scenario is that
they are trying to weaken the American economy by linking America with
China. A war between these states would cause the collapse of the
American economic powerhouse.
I would like examine our current China policy in a historical context.
We adopted a Communist containment policy after World War II, when the
Soviet Union was breathing down Western Europe's neck and China
threatened the Korean peninsula. The Soviets found a weak Europe ripe
for the taking; it took half and threatened a land invasion to the other
half. Secretary of State Dean Acheson neglectfully left Korea off a
list of American defensive periphery and soon thereafter the
Chinese-and-Soviet-bolstered North Korean Army swept south. The Korean
War was an attempt to contain the so-called Red Menace, which had its
origins in both Russia and China.
Right now, China is a very strong, but regional, player. But the
Chinese will rise to global power in the east. Whether they will come
at America with swords drawn or hand extended is still up in the air.
It is America's hope that containing China -- keeping it down
economically and strategically -- will be the key to maintaining
American hegemony throughout the 21st century.
Sources:
"China oil firm in Unocal bid war." BBC News, 23 June 2005. Internet: BBC News, accessed 7 April 2006.
"Iraq War costs could hit $570 billion US by 2010, troop levels not sustainable," CBC News, Internet: CBC News, accessed 7 April 2006.
Kissinger, Henry. "China: Containment Won't Work." Washington Post, 13 June 2005. Internet: Washington Post, accessed 7 April 2006.
"Structural Realism After the Cold War." by Kenneth Waltz. From Kaufman, et.al., Understanding International Relations: The Value of Alternative Lenses. Boston, McGraw-Hill. 2004.
Williams, Ian. "China-US: Double bubbles in danger of colliding." Asia Times, 23 January 2004. Internet: Asia Times, accessed 7 April 2006.
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